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THE OVERTHROW OF MONROE v. PAPE: A
CHAPTER IN THE LEGACY OF
THURGOOD MARSHALL
CONRAD K HARPER *
As the first Director-Counsel of the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund,
otherwise known as the "Inc. Fund," Thurgood Marshall helped establish the
Inc Fund's tradition of landmark civil rights litigation. Mr. Harper discusses in
this article the role played by the Inc Fund and Justice Marshall in overthrowing
Monroe v. Pape and its curtailment of civil rights suits against municipalities
The instrument for change was Harkess v. Sweeny Independent School District
a suit filed on behalf of seventeen Black schoolteachers who were discriminatorily
fired by a Texas school district
N 1961, the Supreme Court handed down Monroe v. Pape,' and evis-
cerated a valuable civil rights remedy by barring civil rights suits
against municipalities and local governments.2 Since its passage in 1871,
the Civil Rights Act3 has protected all persons from the violation of con-
stitutional rights by any "person" acting "under color" of the law of any
state.4 In Monroe, however, Justice Douglas, writing for the Court,
reached deep into the legislative history of the 1871 Act. Buried in a
debate concerning the liability of municipalities for Ku Klux Klan vio-
lence, he found justification for the premise that Congress never author-
ized the imposition of civil rights liability on local governmental entities.5
Monroe and its progeny would prove to be a frustrating barrier to civil
rights litigation for many years.6 In 1966, however, my colleagues and I
* Partner at Simpson Thacher & Bartlett and former president of the Association of
the Bar of the City of New York, B.A. Howard University, 1962; LL.B. Harvard Law
School, 1965. This paper could not have been prepared without the scholarship of my
colleague at Simpson Thacher & Bartlett, Jeanne M. Farnan.
1. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
2. See id. at 191-92.
3. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
4. The Civil Rights Act was first enacted as section 1 of the Ku Klux Klan Act of
1871. See Comment, Carter v. Carlson: The Monroe Doctrine At Bay, 58 Va. L Rev.
143, 144 (1972).
5. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 188-91 (1961). In his vigorous dissent in
Monroe, Justice Frankfurter found the majority's focus on the legislative history sur-
rounding the imposition of municipal liability for the Ku Klux Klan violence in the 1871
Act to be inappropriate. Rather, Frankfurter argued, the focus should have been on the
adoption of § 1983 to enforce the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment. The use of
the Fourteenth Amendment to protect an individual's constitutional rights against the
unconstitutional acts of municipalities and local governmental units was supported by the
legislative history of the 1871 Act and the full title of that Act: "An Act to Enforce the
Provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and
for other Purposes." Id. at 204-06.
6. See Don B. Kates, Jr., Suing Municipalities and Other Public Entities Under the
Federal Civil Rights Act, 4 Clearinghouse Rev. 177, 177 (1970) ("One of the most irksome
technical problems of litigation under 42 USC 1983 (the so-called federal Civil Rights
Act) is the question of whether public entities are proper defendants, and if so, for what
forms of relief.").
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at the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund ("Inc. Fund") em-
barked on a case that opened an important crack in Monroe.
When I arrived at the Inc. Fund in 1965, Jack Greenberg was Direc-
tor-Counsel. Thurgood Marshall, the first Director-Counsel, had been
away four years, first as a Second Circuit Judge, and, more recently, as
Solicitor General. The ethos of that great civil rights "law firm," whose
roots went back to 1935 and the legendary Charles Hamilton Houston,
affected me immediately. We were in the business of breaking precedent
and establishing new law.
In the 1960s, in belated response to the Supreme Court's desegregation
decisions in the two Brown7 cases, many school districts consolidated
their formerly all-Black and all-White schools. In many areas, however,
local school boards simply did not rehire Black teachers who had for-
merly taught in all-Black schools.
In May, 1966, the Inc. Fund began representing Black teachers in
Sweeny, Texas, where seventeen out of twenty-five Black teachers had
not been rehired for the next school year.' We drew up a fairly straight-
forward complaint on behalf of the teacher-plaintiffs, naming as defend-
ants each member of the district's school board and the superintendant in
both their individual and representative capacities. The case came for
trial in the federal district court sitting in Galveston in 1967.1
During voir dire, some of the venire panel indicated that they would
not assess the back pay award we had requested against the individual
school board members. We made a hurried decision to dismiss the de-
fendants as individuals, thus maintaining the action against the board
members and the superintendant solely in their official capacities.' 0
The defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that, per Monroe, the board
members and the superintendant in their official capacities were not
proper defendants under section 1983.11 The motion was carried with
the case. The all-White jury returned a special verdict, finding no racial
discrimination, but also finding that plaintiffs' filing of the lawsuit was a
factor in the school district's decision not to rehire them.' 2
In post-trial argument we asserted that the decision not to rehire vio-
lated plaintiffs' First Amendment right to seek redress of grievances.
The district court, however, granted defendants' motion to dismiss, find-
ing that the suit against the defendants in their official capacities violated
7. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (Brown 11); Brown v. Board of
Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (Brown 1).
8. See Harkless v. Sweeny Indep. Sch. Dist., 427 F.2d 319, 320 (5th Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 991 (1971).
9. See Harkless v. Sweeny Indep. Sch. Dist., 278 F. Supp. 632 (S.D. Tex. 1968).
Trial counsel were W. Haywood Bums, then an Inc. Fund staff lawyer, and now Dean of
the CUNY Law School; and Weldon H. Berry, a skilled Houston practicioner; and I.
10. See Harkless v. Sweeny Indep. Sch. Dist., 300 F. Supp. 794, 795 (S.D. Tex. 1969),
rev'd, 427 F.2d 319 (1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 991 (1971).
11. See id. at 799.
12. See id.
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Monroe's prohibition against section 1983 suits that name municipalities
as defendants. 13
By 1969, many cases, including some in the Supreme Court, 4 had per-
mitted section 1983 actions against local governments and municipalities
without directly evaluating the impact of these decisions on the holding
in Monroe. On the other hand, federal courts often found it easy to use
Monroe for dismissal of actions and denial of remedies against local gov-
ernmental entities."5 In the old Fifth Circuit, it seemed foolish for us to
mount an all-out attack on the then relatively recent Supreme Court
holding in Monroe, but we could and did argue that our case was not
limited by the Monroe decision. 6 My many happy hours in the library of
the Association of the Bar, the Law Library of Congress, and the
Supreme Court Library poring over old records, briefs, and Reconstruc-
tion history finally yielded a plan.
Our attack was simple. We assured the Fifth Circuit that Monroe did
not address our situation.'7 Even though plaintiffs were requesting back
pay, the remedy was essentially restitution, not damages, and therefore
not covered by Monroe. Much of the furor surrounding Monroe and the
legislative history of section 1983 was based on the fear that local govern-
mental coffers would be emptied by constitutional, tort-based suits
originating in the thoughtless, wrongful acts of governmental
employees.'
13. See id. at 806-07.
14. See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969)
(plaintiffs sought equitable relief for school suspension after wearing black armbands to
protest the Vietnam War, Supreme Court acknowledged that it was not deciding the
propriety of the relief requested); Turner v. City of Memphis, 369 U.S. 350 (1962) (per
curiam) (injunction against city for operating segregated eating and restroom facilities at
the municipal airport); see also Alexander v. Holmes County Bd. of Educ., 396 U.S. 19
(1969) (per curiam) (Court ordered the board to cease operation of segregated schools
and to establish a unitary school system); McNeese v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 668
(1963) (desegregation cases seeking injunctive relief against local governmental entities).
15. Suits for equitable relief, as well as damages, had been consistently dismissed by
federal courts which based their decisions on Monroe's broad holding that a municipality
is not a "person" under § 1983. See Diamond v. Pitchess, 411 F.2d 565 (9th Cir. 1969)
(seeking equitable relief); Sutton v. City of Philadelphia, 286 F. Supp. 143 (S.D.N.Y.
1968) (same); see also Gittlemacker v. County of Philadelphia, 413 F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1969)
(seeking damages), cert denied, 396 U.S. 1046 (1970); Garrison v. County of Bernalillo,
338 F.2d 1002 (10th Cir. 1964) (per curiam) (same).
16. Brief for Appellants at 7-9, Harkless v. Sweeny Indep. Sch. Dist., 427 F.2d 319
(5th Cir. 1970) (No. 28188).
17. See id
18. During the debates on the Sherman Amendments, senators and representatives
expressed fear that any law permitting recovery of damages from municipalities would
give Congress improper control of cities and could lead to the destruction of municipal
governmental structure and services-with congressional attachments and sale of munici-
pal property such as schools, jails and courthouses-to pay judgments. See Cong. Globe,
42d Cong., 1st Sess. 763-795 (1871); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187-190 (1961); Com-
ment, Injunctive Relief Against Municipalities Under Section 1983, 119 U. Pa. L. Rev.
389, 397 (1970) ("In spite of attempts by proponents to characterize the Sherman amend-
ment as a mutual insurance provision, most members of Congress apparently viewed it as
1992]
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Monroe was essentially a suit for damages, resulting from a wrongful
search and seizure, against certain police officers and the City of Chi-
cago.19 In our case, the Sweeny Independent School District decision not
to rehire Black teachers was not a random tort but a policy decision that,
we argued, deprived the Black teachers of their constitutional rights.2"
We invoked long-standing Supreme Court decisions upholding the
power of the federal government to protect citizens in the face of consti-
tutional violations sponsored by local governmental officials in their offi-
cial capacities.2' In Ex parte Young,22 a state attorney general, who
attempted to enforce an unconstitutional statute, continuously but un-
successfully challenged the district court's authority over him in his offi-
cial capacity. 3 In 1913, in Home Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. City of
Los Angeles,24 a unanimous court found federal judicial power competent
to redress the wrongs of a state official in his official capacity.2 5
Even after Monroe, the Supreme Court allowed the redress of constitu-
an attempt to punish criminally a subdivision of the state for acts done within its
boundaries.").
19. See Monroe, 365 U.S. at 169. In Monroe, the Court allowed the action against the
police officers as individuals but barred any claim that the City was federally liable for the
wrong-doing of its employees which violated merely state law and police policy. See id.
at 172-87.
20. Indeed in his dissent to the Monroe decision, Justice Frankfurter opined that even
the random act of violence by the Chicago police may be chargeable under a form of
"official capacity":
It might also be true merely because the respondents are the police-because
they are clothed with an appearance of official authority which is in itself a
factor of significance in dealings between individuals. Certainly the night-time
intrustion of the man with a star and a police revolver is a different phenome-
non than the night-time intrusion of a burglar. The aura of power which a
show of authority carries with it has been created by state government. For this
reason the national legislature, exercising its power to implement the Four-
teenth Amendment, might well attribute reponsibility for the intrusion to the
State and legislate to protect against such intrusion.
Id. at 238 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
21. See Brief for Appellants at 16-21, Harkless v. Sweeny Indep. Sch. Dist., 427 F.2d
319 (5th Cir. 1970) (No. 28188).
22. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
23. See Petitioner's Brief on Hearing of Rule to Show Cause at 6-8, Ex parte Young,
209 U.S. 123 (1908) (No. 10, Original); see also Wayne McCormack, Federalism and
Section 1983: Limitations on Judicial Enforcement of Constitutional Protections, Part 1,
60 Va. L. Rev. 1, 44 (1974) ("Young could still be used to justify the designation as
'individual' a suit for injunctive relief that would actually result in payments from the
state treasury, despite the suit's being clearly against the officer as a state agent and not
against him in any individual capacity." (footnote omitted)).
24. 227 U.S. 278 (1913).
25. See id. at 285-87.
[T]he theory of the [Fourteenth] Amendment is that where an officer or other
representative of a State in the exercise of the authority with which he is clothed
misuses the power possessed to do a wrong forbidden by the Amendment, in-
quiry concerning whether the State has authorized the wrong is irrelevant and
the Federal judicial power is competent to afford redress for the wrong by deal-
ing with the officer and the result of his exertion of power.
Id. at 287.
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tional violations by requiring a board of supervisors to levy taxes for
funds to reopen schools that had been shut to avoid desegregation.26 We
argued that this was equitable redress against the board in its official
capacity because the board members could not levy taxes as
individuals.27
We assured the Fifth Circuit that we were not seeking to overturn
numerous federal cases. We were only asking the court to hold explicitly
what was implicit in the law regarding section 1983, namely, that official
illegal conduct is subject to federal judicial power and remedy.28
In Harkless v. Sweeny Independent School District,9 the Fifth Circuit
followed our reasoning and took advantage of a footnote in Monroe3o to
narrow its scope and to find that Monroe did not bar injunctive relief
against school board members in their official capacity.3 I Harkless was
one of the first departures from the binding authority of Monroe in a civil
rights case.32 By 1972, more than half of the circuits had allowed injunc-
26. See Griffin v. County Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 228 (1964) ("[S]uits against state
and county officials to enjoin them from invading constitutional rights are not forbidden
by the Eleventh Amendment.").
27. See Brief for Appellant at 13, Harkless v. Sweeny Indep. Sch. Dist., 427 F.2d 319
(5th Cir. 1970) (No. 28188). The district court's attempt to avoid the result in Griffin on
the supposition that Griffin was not a § 1983 action was erroneous because the request for
a three-judge panel at an early stage in Griffin was a procedural device, not a request for
jurisdiction. Further, Griffin's lineal predecessor was a § 1983 case. See Complaint, Da-
vis v. County Sch. Bd., 142 F. Supp. 616 (E.D. Va. 1956) (No. 1333).
28. See Reply Brief for Appellants at 7-8; Harkless v. Sweeny Indep. Sch. Dist., 427
F.2d 319 (5th Cir. 1970), cert denied, 400 U.S. 991 (1971).
29. 427 F.2d 319 (5th Cir. 1970), cerL denied, 400 U.S. 991 (1971).
30. The court said:
In a few cases in which equitable relief has been sought, a municipality has been
named, along with city officials, as defendant where violations of 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 were alleged. See, eg., Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157;
Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879. The question dealt with in our opin-
ion was not raised in those cases, either by the parties or by the Court. Since we
hold that a municipal corporation is not a "person" within the meaning of
§ 1983, no inference to the contrary can any longer be drawn from those cases.
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 191 n.50 (1961).
31. Responding to the district court's reliance on footnote 50 as meaning that munici-
palities were not "persons" within the meaning of § 1983 for any purpose-in law or in
equity-the Fifth Circuit found:
We do not read footnote 50 so broadly. We read it within the context of the
holding of the court and the text to which it is appended. We think the court
was saying in the footnote that the issue of damages against municipalities
under respondeat superior was a question not raised in the equitable relief cases
cited and that no inference may be drawn from those cases that a municipal
corporation is a person within the meaning of § 1983 for the purposes of a dam-
age claim against it under respondeat superior. We do not perceive that the
court was expanding its holding by a footnote dictum to eliminate municipali-
ties as "persons" under § 1983 for the purpose of equitable relief, a question not
expressly considered in the cited equitable relief cases.
Harkless, 427 F.2d at 322.
32. In Harkless, the Fifth Circuit cited to two Seventh Circuit cases where injunctions
had been permitted against a municipality in § 1983 actions. 427 F.2d at 323. Those
cases were Adams v. City of Park Ridge, 293 F.2d 585 (7th Cir. 1961) and Schnell v. City
1992]
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tive relief against municipalities under the statute. 3
The Supreme Court curbed these developments in City of Kenosha v.
Bruno,34 holding that, because a city was not a "person" with respect to
damages under section 1983, no court could find a city liable for equita-
ble relief under section 1983.3' The brief decision by then-Justice Rehn-
quist was almost immediately met with a chorus of disapproval,3 6 but
there was continued erosion of civil rights claims under this newly-
strengthened Monroe doctrine.3 7
The one "loophole" for civil rights advocates following Kenosha was
the very argument we advanced in Harkless: Plaintiffs could bypass Ke-
nosha by joining city officials in their "official capacities" as named
defendants.38
In 1978, Justice Brennan, in turn, "corrected" Monroe in Monell v.
Department of Social Services39 by conceding that, while the Court had
of Chicago, 407 F.2d 1084 (7th Cir. 1969). See Harkless, 427 F.2d at 323. However,
these and other cases which implicitly allowed equitable relief did not directly address the
weaknesses in Monroe. See Recent Developments, 70 Colum. L. Rev. 1467 (1970)
("[W]ith few exceptions, the cases were decided without any discussion of the logical and
syntactical problem of how the same word in a single sentence can have two different
meanings." (footnote omitted)). Id. at 1471.
33. See Comment, Carter v. Carlson: The Monroe Doctrine at Bay, 58 Va. L. Rev.
143, 157 (1972) (Harkless cited in footnote 74).
34. 412 U.S. 507 (1973).
35. See id. at 513. Relying on the strength of footnote 50 in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S.
167, 191 n.50 (1961), the Kenosha Court held that "[s]ince, as the Court held in Monroe,
'Congress did not undertake to bring municipal corporations within the ambit of' § 1983
they are outside of its ambit for purposes of equitable relief as well as for damages."
Kenosha, 412 U.S. at 513.
36. See Note, The Supreme Court 1972 Term, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1973):
The Court [in Kenosha] thus undertook no independent analysis of the legisla-
tive history of section 1983, relying entirely on the Monroe Court's examination
of that history and on the language of the statute itself.
In resting so heavily on the Monroe Court's interpretation of the legislative
history of section 1983, the Court failed to answer extensive scholarly criticism
of Monroe's use of that history.
Id. at 256.
37. See Adkins v. Duval County Sch. Bd., 511 F.2d 690 (5th Cir. 1975) (county
school board not person under § 1983); Cason v. City of Jacksonville, 497 F.2d 949 (5th
Cir. 1974) (city not a person under the Civil Rights Act).
38. See Ronald M. Levin, The Section 1983 Municipal Immunity Doctrine, 65 Geo.
L.J. 1483, 1498-1501 (1977):
The lower courts were quick to perceive and exploit the loophole in the holding
of Kenosha. As the Third Circuit pointed out in Rochester v. White [503 F.2d
263 (3d Cir. 1974)], other strong reasons justified holding that Kenosha had not
foreclosed suits against officers in their official capacity . . . . The Supreme
Court's own behavior after Kenosha gave additional proof that it had not meant
to announce a substantive limitation on section 1983 liability. The Court rou-
tinely continued reaching the merits in section 1983 cases in which a municipal
officer was sued in his official capacity.
Id. at 1500-01.
39. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
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reaffirmed Monroe without further examination on three occasions," "it
can scarcely be said that Monroe is so consistent with the warp and woof
of civil rights law as to be beyond question."4 In Monell, the Supreme
Court held that Congress intended that municipalities, local governmen-
tal units,42 and local governmental officials,43 sued in their official capaci-
ties, be directly suable under section 1983 for discrimination or other
deprivations of constitutional rights.'
Monell followed the Fifth Circuit's analysis in Harkless-without cit-
ing the latter-by leaving undisturbed Monroe's holding that the "doc-
trine of respondeat superior is not a basis for rendering municipalities
liable under section 1983 for the constitutional torts of their employ-
ees."' 45 Monell marked the end of Monroe's protective role for school
boards, local governments, or their officials engaged in discrimination in
their representative capacity."
Section 1983 cases have proliferated post-Monell.4' There are various
schools of thought on what are the outer limits of liability for municipali-
ties under Monell.4 Among the open issues are whether a random "ille-
40. See Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1 (1976); City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S.
507 (1973); Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693 (1973).
41. Monell, 436 U.S. at 696.
42. The Supreme Court stated that "[l]ocal governing bodies, therefore, can be sued
directly under § 1983 for monetary, declaratory, or injunctive relief where, as here, the
action that is alleged to be unconstitutional implements or executes a policy statement,
ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body's of-
ficers." Id. at 690.
43. The Court stated:
Since official-capacity suits generally represent only another way of pleading an
action against an entity of which an officer is an agent-at least where Eleventh
Amendment considerations do not control analysis--our holding today that lo-
cal governments can be sued under § 1983 necessarily decides that local govern-
ment officials sued in their official capacities are "persons" under § 1983 in
those cases in which, as here, a local government would be suable in its own
name.
Idl at 690 n.55.
44. See id. at 690. Monell involved pregnant employees of the Department of Social
Services and the Board of Education of the City of New York who were compelled "to
take unpaid leaves of absence before such leaves were required for medical reasons. The
suit sought injunctive relief and backpay for periods of unlawful forced leave." Iad at 661
(citation and footnote omitted).
45. Id at 663-64 n.7.
46. See id. at 694-95. "First, Monroe v. Pape, insofar as it completely immunizes
municipalities from suit under § 1983, was a departure from prior practice." Id. at 695.
47. See, e.g., Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989); Cannon v.
University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
48. See Barbara Kritchevsky, "Or Causes to be Subjected'". The Role of Causation in
Section 1983 Municipal Liability Analysis, 35 UCLA L. Rev. 1187 (1988). She wrote:
Some members of the Court have strayed from reliance on the statute's lan-
guage and the principles it incorporates in an effort to escape the heavy burden
they believe § 1983 actions place on the federal courts. See Patsy v. Board of
Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 533 (1982) (Powell, J., dissenting); Maine v. Thiboutot,
448 U.S. 1, 22-25 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting). Indeed, this fear of a "torrent"
of litigation was urged as a reason for adhering to Monroe's holding that munic-
1992]
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gal" or "extra-legal" act of a municipal employee or agent is covered,4 9
and whether a municipal employee is personally responsible for constitu-
tional violations resulting from employee acts within the bounds of the
locality's prescribed policy. 0
The Supreme Court has recently grafted the Fourteenth Amendment
argument in Exparte Young 5 onto a section 1983 decision. 2 In Will v.
Michigan Department of State Police, 3 the Court held that a state offi-
cial, in his official capacity, is not protected by the Eleventh Amend-
ment 54 when sued under section 1983 for injunctive relief because, under
section 1983, "'official-capacity actions for prospective relief are not
treated as actions against the State.' "5' Using the Ex parte Young "fic-
tion" of separating a state actor from the state when the state actor is
violating the Constitution, Will continues to prohibit damages actions
against state officials under section 1983.56
ipalities were not "persons" within the meaning of § 1983. Monell v. Depart-
ment of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 724 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ....
Id. at 1193 n.23.
49. Monell explicitly rejects making a municipality liable under § 1983 in respondeat
superior for its employees and/or agents. See 436 U.S. at 691 ("[A] municipality cannot
be held liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor."). But see Susanah M. Mead, 42
U.SC. § 1983 Municipal Liability: The Monell Sketch Becomes a Distorted Picture, 65
N.C. L. Rev. 517 (1987). ("Professor Mead argues that the Court's rejection of respon-
deat superior in favor of policy or custom causation requirement has erected a significant
barrier to section 1983 municipal liability." (student introduction to Professor Mead's
article)).
50. See Harold S. Lewis, Jr. & Theodore Y. Blumoff, Reshaping Section 1983's Asym-
metry, 140 U. Pa. L. Rev. 755 (1992). They wrote:
Whenever an individual agent causes a recognized constitutional harm, she is
prima facie liable even if the entity approved her conduct and she had a blame-
less state of mind. Nevertheless, the Court, prompted by concerns about litiga-
tion floodgates, federalism, and judicial interference with discretionary
government decisions, has crafted an expansive affirmative defense that more
than offsets the laxity of the prima facie requirements. Government agents,
including those whose positions make them most likely to inflict injury on ordi-
nary citizens, escape liability for damages by grace of qualified immunity unless
the right violated was previously recognized by judicial precedent of unmistaka-
ble application and clarity.
Id. at 758 (footnotes omitted).
51. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
52. The link between the Fourteenth Amendment and the power of the federal judici-
ary under § 1983 to redress constitutional wrongs was anticipated in Ex parte Young, id.
and Home Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 227 U.S. 278 (1913). In
Ex parte Young, a state official was barred from enforcing unconstitutional state laws,
209 U.S. at 137-38; in Home Telephone, state officials were barred from abusing their
powers, i.e., from acting beyond the powers and scope of state law, 227 U.S. at 287-89. In
both cases, the Court looked to the Fourteenth Amendment as a basis for jurisdiction
over the state actors. See Home Telephone, 227 U.S. at 287; Young, 209 U.S. at 150.
53. 491 U.S. 58 (1989).
54. The Eleventh Amendment prohibits suits "commenced or prosecuted" against
one of the states. U.S. Const. amend. XI.
55. Will, 491 U.S. at 71 n.10 (quoting Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167 n.14
(1985)). See Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159-160 (1908).
56. See Will, 491 U.S. at 71.
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The Court further refined a municipality's liability under section 1983
in Canton v. Harris.57 In Canton, the Court held that if policymakers
acted with "deliberate indifference," and thus failed to provide adequate
training for officers, a city might be responsible if that lack of training
caused injury.58 In the recent case of Collins v. Harker Heights,59 how-
ever, the Court limited this approach, finding that the standard of delib-
erate indifference may be used only for "identifying ... the threshold for
holding a city responsible for the constitutional torts committed by its
inadequately trained agents."'  The Court held that section 1983 cannot
be used to invoke municipal liability without a showing of a constitu-
tional violation.61 The Court found no constitutional due process protec-
tion and analogized petitioner's claim to a fairly typical state-law tort
claim.62
The vicissitudes of section 1983 illustrate a powerful truth in our juris-
prudence. To root out discrimination against racial and other protected
groups we resort to broad remedies like the Fourteenth Amendment and
its statutory creature, section 1983. Tension sets in when these protec-
tions are invoked by others whose claims are literally within the legisla-
tive words but whose facts do not supply the classic racial or protected
group predicate for relief. So, in Monroe, the search and seizure claim
had no racial or protected group component. The non-classic context
provides an opportunity to rethink the historical and intellectual founda-
tions for the remedy and may lead, as in Monroe, to its curtailment. The
special moment of truth arrives-as in Harkless with plaintiff Black
teachers, and in Monell with plaintiff pregnant employees-when the
husk of doctrine elaborated outside of a racial or protected group case is
shown to be dead weight in adjudicating a constitutional claim of dis-
crimination intended for statutory cure. Once the classic race or pro-
tected group claim is understood as well-anchored, other conceptually
similar constitutional claims are rendered, in principle, indistinguishable.
Justice Marshall recognized this distinction. He delivered the opinion
of the Court in Moor v. County of Alameda,63 which refused to expand
vicarious liability to a county following an accidental discharge of a shot-
gun by a county sheriff.6" Justice Marshall also concurred in City of Ke-
nosha v. Bruno,61 which involved a county's refusal to provide a liquor
57. 489 U.S. 378 (1989).
58. See id. at 388.
59. 112 S. Ct. 1061 (1992).
60. Id. at 1068 (emphasis added).
61. See id. at 1069. Petitioner had claimed as the basis of her "constitutional" claim
that the city deprived her husband of life and liberty by failing to provide a reasonably
safe work environment. See id.
62. See id. at 1070; see also Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 332 (1986) (the Due
Process Clause "does not purport to supplant traditional tort law in laying down rules of
conduct to regulate liability for injuries that attend living together in society.").
63. 411 U.S. 693 (1973).
64. See id. at 721.
65. 412 U.S. 507 (1973).
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license.66 Discrimination was not the basis of either of these suits. Jus-
tice Marshall participated in Justice Brennan's vigorous dissent in the
next section 1983 case which the Supreme Court dismissed, Aldinger v.
Howard,67 in which a woman employee alleged that a county had dis-
criminated against her and fired her because she was living with her boy-
friend.6" Justice Brennan reasoned that:
"Section 1983 opened the federal courts to private citizens, offering a
uniquely federal remedy against incursions under the claimed author-
ity of state law upon rights secured by the Constitution and laws of the
Nation" .... "The very purpose of § 1983 was to interpose the federal
courts between the States and the people, as guardians of the people's
federal rights-to protect the people from unconstitutional acts under
color of state law, 'whether that action be executive, legislative or
judicial.' ,69
The collision of Harkless with Monroe illustrates the Inc. Fund tradi-
tion: Never be discouraged by settled adverse doctrine. Official segrega-
tion would not have been overthrown, nor Monroe overruled in Monell, if
stare decisis had been left unchallenged.
With the demise of Monroe and the rise of Monell, a statutory under-
pinning of Thurgood Marshall's greatest victory was restored. For the
plaintiffs in Brown relied on the 1871 Civil Rights Act,7 0 now codified as
42 U.S.C. § 1983.
66. See id. at 516.
67. 427 U.S. 1 (1976).
68. See id. at 3.
69. Id. at 33-34 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225,
238-39, 242 (1972), quoting Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 346 (1879)).
70. The three federal cases that formed the basis of the Supreme Court's decision in
Brown were premised on the Civil Rights Acts of 1871, 42d Cong. 1st Sess. (1871), and 8
U.S.C. § 43, the predecessor statute to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. As the petitioner's amended
complaint stated:
This action is authorized by the Act of April 20, 1871, Chapter 22, section 1, 17
Stat. 13 (Title 8, United States Code, section 43), to be commenced by any
citizen of the United States or other persons within the jurisdiction thereof to
redress the deprivation, under color of a state law, statute, ordinance, regula-
tion, custom or usage, or rights, privileges and immunities secured by the Four-
teenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, section 1, and by
the Act of May 31, 1870, Chapter 114, section 16, 16 Stat. 144 (Title 8, United
States Code, Section 41), providing for the equal rights of citizens and of all
other persons within the jurisdiction of the United States, as hereinafter more
fully appears.
Amended Complaint at 2, Brown v. Board of Educ. of Topeka, 98 F. Supp. 797 (D. Kan.
1951) (No. T-316 Civil). See Complaint at 6, Davis v. County Sch. Bd., 164 F. Supp. 786
(E.D. Va. 1951) (Civil Action No. 1333); Complaint at 2-3, Briggs v. Elliot, Civil Action
No. 2657 (E.D.S.C. Dec. 22, 1950). All of the above documents are found in the Record
at Vol. 79-83, Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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